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The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1905 was a watershed moment for the presence of the Royal Navy 
in the Pacific. Although it allowed the Royal Navy to concentrate its fleets in European waters, 
this strategy caused resentment due to the underlying fear of the ‘Yellow Peril’, especially in the 
British dominions of Australia and New Zealand. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance presented some 
challenges to the received Edwardian racial hierarchy and the idea of British military supremacy. 
This article demonstrates how the ‘port town’ not only became a place of mediation where high-
level international diplomacy mingled with the face-to-face experience of an alliance ‘in practice’, 
but also a space through which issues such as Otherness and imperial security were contested and 
explored. 
 
The 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance marked the end of Britain’s ‘splendid isolation’.1 Such an 
alliance presented some interesting complications when courting diplomatic, military, and public 
opinion in Britain because the Japanese did not neatly fit into the concept of ‘Western’ Edwardian 
racial hierarchy as they were not White, nor were they European by geography or descent.2  
                                                 
1 Nicolas Lambert, ‘Economy or Empire? The Fleet Unit Concept and the Quest for Collective Security in the 
Pacific, 1909-1914 , in K. Neilson and G. Kennedy, eds., Far Flung Lines: Essays in Honour of Donald M. 
Schurman, (Abingdon, 2009), 55. 
2 Traditional allies for the Western Powers were European or White settler dominions such as the United States. 
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Certainly there were complex cultural and racial hierarchies to negotiate as a consequence of an 
alliance with rising non-White and non-European nation. Rotem Kowner has argued that the 
Japanese posed a particular conundrum for the West at this time as they ‘defied’ the tacit rules of 
the colonial encounter by not being submissive or uncivilised.3 He highlighted the creation of a 
discourse in response to a perceived threat which cast the Japanese as inferior and marked them as 
a ‘menacing Other’.4 Prior to the Imperial Japanese Navy’s (IJN) convincing victory against the 
Russian Fleet at Tsushima (1905) Japan was indulged very much like a child, or an upstart, on the 
world stage.5 After this time ‘they were perceived as aggressive, insolent, and even dangerous 
imperialists.’6 However, this article will revise Kowner’s assertion and add nuance to the 
perception of pre-First World War interracial hostility by highlighting how the narrative of the 
‘menacing Other’ was complicated by the spirit of alliance and diplomacy. Indeed, Anthony Best 
argued that due to the underlying fear so-called ‘Yellow Peril’ Britain and Japan had to ‘finesse 
the racial and cultural divide’ following the Alliance rather than pursue a campaign of racially-
based hostility.  This, he has maintained, was achieved by high-level court diplomacy and the 
bestowal of titles and decorations to Japanese royalty.7  
                                                 
3 Rotem Kowner, ‘‘Lighter than Yellow, But not Enough’: Western Discourse on the Japanese ‘Race’, 1854-1904.’ 
The Historical Journal, 43, No. 1 (2000), 104. 
4 Kowner, ‘Lighter than Yellow’, 105. 
5 See for example the Punch cartoon entitled ‘The Infant Phenomenon. Little Jap lecturing on the Art of War to the 
European Representatives’, produced during the Sino-Japanese War. Punch (London), 22 December 1894. 
6 Kowner, ‘Lighter than Yellow’, 130. 
7 Antony Best, ‘Race, Monarchy, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922’, Social Science Japan Journal, 9, 
No. 2 (2006), 171. 
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An overlooked arena within which world politics was played out was the port town, or port 
city.8 Recent scholarship on the social and cultural history of ports has highlighted how these areas 
served as the threshold between the urban space and the maritime world; often leading to cultural 
exchanges which could challenge established ‘norms’ and boundaries.9 Port towns and cities thus 
become contact zones where these established values were reassessed and negotiated via face-to-
face interaction with the Other. This article, therefore, will highlight the importance of place and 
space in assessing powerful cultural interactions in situ; experienced by multiple agents including 
the ruling elites and civic powers, and filtered down to the public via discourse in the local press 
and lavish public ceremonies such as parades and ‘showing the flag’. Taking Jan Rüger’s concept 
of ‘naval theatre’ and combining it with the idea of the urban maritime space as a contact zone, I 
will argue that port towns and cities, such as Portsmouth, Melbourne and Sydney, were vital 
components in the ideological battle within the British World to reconcile the public on issues of 
imperial security.  Although the Japanese allies were treated with the respect and due ceremony 
bestowed on any other visiting White allies, due to the varied preoccupations of the host ports the 
surrounding discourse in the British and Australian settings produced quite different focuses. 
Portsmouth’s encounter with the IJN normalised and, to a large extent, un-Othered the Japanese 
by showcasing their affinity with naval traditions. Moreover, they were presented as non-
threatening as they were a valued customer of British shipbuilding technology. In Melbourne and 
Sydney, however, discourse was punctuated with an underlying suspicion of the motives of their 
                                                 
8 Portsmouth did not become a city until 1926. 
9 Brad Beaven, Karl Bell and Rob James, ‘Introduction’, in B. Beaven, K. Bell and R. James, eds.,  Port Towns and 
Urban Cultures. International Histories of the Waterfront, c.1700-2000 (Basingstoke, 2016), 1. 
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new guardians in the Pacific, and heightened calls for a Dominion Navy which would endow 
Australia with greater security in its own waters.  
Japanese expansion and Western suspicion 
The article will concentrate on two, almost simultaneous, visits of the Imperial Japanese Navy 
to Portsmouth in Britain, and Melbourne and Sydney in Australia in 1906. Using a comparative 
approach it will explore how national and international discourses on diplomatic relations were 
mediated and understood in provincial Britain and the outposts of the British Empire. The alliance 
with Japan, however, was conceived amid a heightened threat to the British Isles from the growing 
Imperial German Navy. The role of the Royal Navy in the defence of British shores gained 
increasing public interest during the Edwardian period due to the escalation of the Naval Arms 
Race with Germany and the other world powers. The Naval Defence Act (1889) created the ‘Two 
Power Standard’, whereby the Royal Navy pledged to be twice as large as any other nation’s 
navy.10 However, the rise of the German Imperial Navy, and German expansion into the Pacific 
with the annexation of New Guinea in 1884 meant that naval defence of the Empire had become 
more onerous. The alliance with Japan has retrospectively been rationalised as a convenience 
which allowed the Royal Navy to reduce costs and secure areas of interest in the far reaches of the 
British Empire by concentrating their fleets in European, and ultimately Home Waters, in order to 
ward off the German threat to the British Isles.11 However, the growing influence of Japan 
following the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War, especially after 
                                                 
10 D. Redford and P. D. Grove, The Royal Navy Since 1900 (London, 2014), 20. 
11 Redford and Grove, The Royal Navy, 20; John Beeler, ‘Steam, Strategy and Shurman Imperial Defence in the Post 
Crimean Era, 1856-1905’, in K. Neilson and G. Kennedy, eds., Far Flung Lines: Essays in Honour of Donald 
M. Schurman, (Abingdon, 2009), 27. 
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their emphatic victory at the Battle of Tsushima (1905), meant that the balance of power in the 
Pacific had shifted considerably by the time the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed.  
The Alliance raised suspicions and distrust among contemporary British defence experts and 
catalysed serious debates about imperial security across the Empire. Certainly, it precipitated 
suspicion in the Antipodes, leading to the formation of the Australian and New Zealand navies 
before the First World War.12  In the higher echelons of the British Navy Admiralty, officials 
harboured suspicions over Japan’s reliability as an ally. Prior to the Alliance in 1901, British 
military attaché in Tokyo, Lieutenant-Colonel John Churchill argued that: 
I cannot imagine that any European Power is likely to ally itself with Japan, since what are 
the two most powerful sentiments in the world, viz; race and religion, are opposed to such 
an alliance, to say nothing of more practical considerations.13  
 
Moreover, First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Walter Kerr asserted in his correspondence to Lord 
Selbourne, the First Lord of the Admiralty, in October of the same year that he felt that the 
‘continued goodwill of an Oriental nation’ was uncertain as a basis for the security of British 
interests in East Asia.14   
Certainly nationalist elements Australia and New Zealand were very wary of the idea that 
they would have to rely on Japan’s presence in the Pacific to protect them from invasion.15 
Australians and New Zealanders were distrustful of the Japanese, who were regarded as 
                                                 
12 John C. Mitcham, ‘Navalism and Greater Britain, 1897-1914’, in D. Redford, ed., Maritime Culture and Identity: 
The Sea, Culture and the Modern World (London, 2014), 209. 
13 The National Archives, FO46/547. Lt-Col Churchill to Directorate of Military Intelligence, 23 May 1901. Quoted 
in Best, ‘Race, Monarchy’, 173. 
14 Correspondence between Kerr and Selbourne, 05 October 1901, quoted in Best, “Race, Monarchy”, 173. 
15 Mitcham, Race and Imperial Defence in the British World, 1870-1914 (Cambridge, 2016), 209. 
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expansionist and a threat to the antipodes themselves. Indeed, this critical alliance to safeguard the 
Pacific was conceived at a time when questions were being asked about Australia’s coastal 
defence. Australia’s politicians were keen to create their own Dominion Navy, either to assert 
increasing independence from Britain, or to answer increasing demands from navalist agencies 
like the Naval Defence League for the Dominions to ‘pay their way’ in the defence of the Empire. 
In addition to the hopes of building a strong defence force the country had been active in securing 
a White Australia policy. Australia’s Federal Immigration Restriction Act (1901) was specifically 
designed to exclude non-White, and specifically Asian, settlement in the country. Labour 
politician, and later Prime Minister of Australia, Billy Hughes labelled the spread of Asian 
immigration through the unpopulated areas of Queensland as a ‘leprous curse’ and argued that it 
threatened to make the newly Federalised Australia ‘a country no longer fit for the white man, 
because it will shortly be a country where no white man can compete with our cheap, industrious 
and virtuous, but undesirable Japanese and Chinese friends.’16  
The visits to Britain and Australia in 1906 would have absorbed some of these diplomatic 
tensions and mistrust. It is interesting, therefore, to explore how the Alliance was ‘sold’ to the 
public of Britain and the Greater British World. The timing of the visits was an important factor, 
coming as they did after the Japanese victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, and after 
the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1905. Of primacy to the Japense agenda was to seek 
to redress the imbalances of formerly ‘Unequal Treaties.’ The visit to Portsmouth from 27 May to 
8 June 1906 was conducted under the auspices of showing off their newly-constructed state-of-
the-art battleships, the Katori and Kashima, which they had taken command of from the shipyards 
                                                 
16 W. M. Hughes, ‘12 Sept 1901,’ Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 
Vol. 37 (1901), c. 4822. 
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of Barrow and Newcastle. The visits to Australia was undertaken by a training squadron of three 
ships, Hashidate, Itsukushima, and Matushima, which were used to provide naval cadets of the 
IJN with seafaring experience. The squadron called at Port Arthur, Wei Hai Wei, and other Chinese 
ports, before descending to Manila in the Philippines, the Australian territory of Thursday Island, 
and then Townsville in Queensland. They were received in Melbourne on 9 May, before departing 
on 17 May to reach Sydney on 21 May. It left Sydney to return to Japan on 28 May.17  
Naval theatre and the port  
Rüger argued that between 1880 and 1914 Spithead off the shore of Portsmouth was ‘formalized 
as a ritual arena for the display of the monarch’s ‘ocean throne’.’18 Importantly, this naval theatre, 
which included such spectacles as fleet reviews and battleship launches, could be interpreted by 
its audience in a number of ways as it allowed for ‘the projection of local, regional, national and 
imperial loyalties.’19  Indeed, John C. Mitcham has argued that through the deployment of naval 
theatre the Royal Navy espoused a concept of a ‘Sea Empire’; allowing the far sinews of the 
Empire to unite under a unified identity which could breed loyalty to the British metropole.20 
However, this notion often excluded the participation of non-White citizens of Empire. Although 
army regiments of Sikhs and Ghurkhas were co-opted into Imperial Britain’s military tapestry 
through the concept of ‘martial races’, such extensions were not afforded in a maritime capacity.21 
                                                 
17 Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 1906. 
18 Rüger, The Great Naval Game. Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire (Cambridge, 2007), 19. 
19 Rüger, The Great Naval Game, 35. 
20 Mitcham, ‘Navalism and Greater Britain’, 284.  
21 For examples of ‘martial races’ see Heather Streets, Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British 
Imperial Culture, 1857-1914 (Manchester, 2004). 
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Certainly, the acceptance of a ‘gifted’ ship from the Federated States of Malaya in 1912, 
subsequently named HMS Malaya, garnered less attention from the British press than White 
Dominion ‘gift’ ships such as HMS Australia and HMS New Zealand.22 The acceptance into the 
fold of an Asian ally with power in the Pacific and who was also independent of British rule was 
thus a departure from the narrative of Britain’s Sea Empire. The incorporation of the IJN into 
Britain’s Sea Empire therefore had to be carefully choreographed. However, there was no one-
size-fits-all template for hospitality for the IJN, and each port showcased its own brand of imperial 
culture to its visitors.23 
By the turn of the twentieth century Portsmouth had become a place of international 
entertainment and diplomacy whereby the concept of ‘civic pride’ had become conflated with 
wider notions of imperial duty.24 The staging of events of national and international maritime 
significance such as naval reviews, ship launches, and visits by royalty and foreign dignitaries 
ensured that Portsmouth’s played a significant role in the Empire’s international relations. The 
town’s Royal Naval Dockyard proudly built the Navy’s capital ships, and although Katori and 
Kashima were built in private shipyards, the Imperial Japanese Navy’s visit stood as an important 
litmus test for navalist sentiment in the wider British maritime community. Portsmouth Mayor Sir 
George Couzens boasted at a welcome luncheon for the IJN fleet that ‘sailors of any nation can 
always reckon upon a hearty welcome and cordial hospitality at Portsmouth.’25 However, the 
                                                 
22 Mitcham, ‘Navalism and Greater Britain’, 285. 
23 See Brad Beaven’s study on Portsmouth, Leeds and Coverntry in Brad Beaven, Visions of Empire: Patriotism, 
Popular Culture and the City, 1870-1939 (Manchester, 2012), 36-37.   
24 Beaven, Visions of Empire, 14.   
25 Army and Navy Gazette (London), 09 June 1906. 
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presence of the Royal Navy in the town was not wholly beneficial to the municipal government. 
The Admiralty, as the major employer and landowner in the town, had very little interest in the 
town’s affairs and it was often ‘left to ‘seek its own salvation’ in regards to providing the 
prerequisite public infrastructure of modern civic society such as prestigious municipal buildings, 
housing, sanitation and transport links.26 Although the Portsmouth Corporation was hospitable and 
accommodating, acknowledging as they did their importance in the communication of the British 
imperial message, it is important to note that this relationship was entered into on the civic elite’s 
own terms. A lavish banquet in the Town Hall was provided for their guests who sat underneath a 
flag of the borough’s arms ‘“supported” by the Union Jack and the flag of Nippon.’27 Indeed the 
visit of the Imperial Japanese Navy, like many other international fleet visits, provided a perfect 
opportunity to showcase Portsmouth on the world stage. Mayor Couzens acted as ambassador to 
Portsmouth as a great naval and imperial town when he declared  
In the name of the inhabitants of Portsmouth I wish our guests a safe return to the Land of 
the Rising Sun in their new battleships, and express the hope that they will come again to 
Portsmouth. Here, as elsewhere in the Brtish Dominions, they may rely, at all times, upon 
an affectionate and hearty welcome.28 
 
In Australia on the other hand, the visit of the Japanese Navy was taken as an opportunity to 
showcase the country on a world stage. In the fledgling years of its Federacy, Australia’s displays 
of hospitality signalled as much to the British Imperial metropole as they did to the visiting 
Japanese Navy. Visitors in both cities were greeted in auspicious public buildings by Federal and 
State leaders, the local civic elite, and businessmen. In Melbourne, they were invited to call on the 
                                                 
26 John Field, ‘Wealth, Styles of Life and Social Tone amongst Portsmouth’s Middle Class, 1800-1875’ in R. J. 
Morris, ed., Class, Power and Social Structure in British Nineteenth-century Towns (Leicester, 1986), 75-77. 
27 EN, 06 June 1906. 
28 EN, 06 June 1906. 
10 
 
Chairman of the Stock Exchange, the Chamber of Commerce and the Law Courts; all signals of 
the thriving infrastructure of a self-governing Western Democracy.29 John Griffiths characterised 
the Australian civic elites of this period as upper-middle class ‘who were most closely identified 
with the British middle classes’ and ‘exercised power by recourse to the British link through ... 
largely London-based imperial institutions.’ 30 In line with their desire to fulfil their imperial duty. 
The Australian hosts’ display of hospitality signalled an incorporation of the Japanese on the 
global-local stage, which accommodated the requirements of the metropole’s politics. At odds with 
this, however, was a strong call for independence and Griffiths has also noted the tenancy of the 
Australian working classes in general to reject ‘the frippery of the Empire’ and to only accept ‘the 
imperial project when it offered scope for colonial development.’31 This analysis of port town 
diplomacy, therefore, underlines the assertion that the influence and reception of imperial 
discourses were plural and meant differing things at different times, or in different circumstances, 
to a range of different people. Although the patterns of hospitality and the overall rhetoric of the 
visits were similar, the visits of the Japanese Imperial Navy had very different implications across 
of the British World. 
During the visits in provincial Britain and two major cities in Australia Japanese naval men 
were presented as equals, which forced the port town populace to confront notions of perceived 
cultural difference. Thus, the port town became an important testing ground through which to 
cement the Alliance and legitimise it to the public. Moreover, it served as projection to their 
Japanese allies that the British were committed, and had faith and goodwill which extended beyond 
                                                 
29 The Examiner (Launceston, Tasmania), 17 May 1906. 
30 John Griffiths, Imperial Culture in Antipodean Cities, 1880-1939 (Basingstoke, 2014), 27. 
31 Griffiths, Imperial Culture, 27. 
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the chambers of the metropole’s diplomats. To recycle Best’s phrase, at a ‘port town’-level, the 
diplomatic cultural divide was ‘finessed’ by incorporating Japan into the Western concept of 
‘civilised society’. This was achieved especially during the visits by accentuating the naval culture 
shared between Britain and Japan, and showing how ‘Westernised’ the Japanese visitors were.  
 However, it is important that historians view the exchange between the Imperial 
Japanese Navy and the public as something also borne from Japan’s need to galvanise their allies 
and promote themselves as a legitimate world power. In addition to reviewing how the British 
public incorporated and received the Japanese, we must also note the ways in which the Japanese 
facilitated this response. Ruling Japanese attitudes towards Westernisation was somewhat 
ambivalent.  The reforms instituted after the Meiji Ishin in 1868 were geared towards revoking the 
raft of unequal treaties brokered by American and European countries and the desire to compete 
with the West on equal terms, which was also gaining momentum amongst its citizens. 32 The 
institution of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 and its revision in 1905 were steps towards 
international recognition and parity. Certainly, at the forefront of the Japanese assertion for parity 
with the West was the creation of legitimate Western-style armed forces. While the army were 
moulded on French and Prussian models, Britain’s Royal Navy was the paragon for the creation 
of Japan’s sea-going force.33 The Japanese ‘showing the flag’ around the British Empire, exactly 
                                                 
32 This event has been translated as the ‘Meiji Restoration’; however, it is more accurate to describe as ‘Renovation’, 
which takes into account notions of renewal and future-planning rather than a sense of traditionalism and 
retrospection. Janet E. Hunter, The Emergence of Modern Japan: An Introductory History since 1853 (London; 
New York, 1989), 8-9; S. Kadota, ‘The Japanese Embassy in London and its Buildings’, in Ian Nish, ed., 
Japanese Envoys in Britain, 1862-1964 (Leiden, 2007), 3. 
33 Hunter, The Emergence, 270. 
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mirrored the tactics of the Royal Navy.  J. Charles Schencking contends that Japan had cultivated 
a thriving naval culture inspired by British naval pageantry and a pro-naval press which was used 
to garner public favour and raise funds for Japanese naval expansion.34 Driven by a ‘constructed 
consciousness of a South Seas destiny’, the Japanese were active agents in building their own 
image, which arguably downplayed threats to their allies in Britain and the British Empire.35 In 
addition to the host cities’ agendas, therefore, this elaborate naval theatre was employed by the 
Japanese in order to emphasise their ‘Westernisation’ and shared affinities with naval militarism.  
However, the Japanese also accentuated their unique national identity. Certainly, a 
conscious and unconscious hybrid of modernising practices which incorporated Western models 
and Japanese ‘tradition’ was viewed favourably by many cultural commentators and policy 
makers.36 The practice of 'military orientalism' whereby the West festishised and revered Eastern 
ways of war, such as the ancient practice of Bushidō (the way of the warrior) were highly regarded 
in military circles.37  The display of such traditional and innate martial attributes can be evidenced 
through existing photographs showing displays of Jiu Jitsu and bamboo sword fighting on board 
                                                 
34 J. C. Schencking, ‘The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Japanese Navy’, in P. P. O’Brien (ed.) The Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922 (London, 2004), 123-128. See also his monograph Making Waves . Politics, 
Propaganda and the Emergence of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1868-1922 (Stanford, 2005), especially 
Chapter 5. 
35 J. C. Schencking, ‘The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Constructed Consciousness of a South Sea Destiny, 1872-
1921’, Modern Asian Studies, 33, No. 4 (1999), 771. 
36 Hunter, The Emergence, 19. 
37 Porter, ‘Military Orientalism? British Observers of the Japanese Way of War, 1904-1910’, War and Society, 26, 
No. 1 (2007), 3.  
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the Katori while visiting Portsmouth.38 This Orientalist reimagining of the way the Japanese state 
moulded its citizens for war through ascetic practice, systems of honour and rigorous discipline 
was seen as a welcome panacea for many of the perceived deficits in Edwardian society, which 
following the Boer War, was experiencing a crisis centring on notions of the degeneracy of the so-
called British ‘race’.   
While this may have been comforting for the British, a departure from a Western navalist 
imperial narrative unsettled the Australians. Certainly it was significant that the visit was 
conducted by a training squadron of naval cadets, which would lessen the direct threat of a fully-
equipped and trained battle fleet in Australian waters. The visit of a young navy with an impressive 
training squadron also satisfied those who believed in investing in the military training of 
Australians for the defence of their own shores. Moreover, the prestige of the visit was still assured 
by the touting of the Squadron’s commander, Rear-Admiral Shimamura, as Chief of Staff to 
Admiral Togo during the Russo-Japanese War.39 In published interviews with the Japanese 
Commander Shimamura’s credentials as a product of Royal Navy training. This was further 
consolidated by foregrounding his service the IJN against the Chinese during the Boxer Rebellion 
(1899-1901), and mention of his many decorations for distinguished service and heroism.40 Indeed, 
when directly quizzed about Australia’s immigration policy Shimamura tactfully demurred ‘About 
that I cannot speak; but your harbour is very beautiful.’41 
                                                 
38 M. E. Pescott-Frost collection, Portsmouth History Centre; Evening News (Portsmouth), 08 June 1906. Later 
references to the Evening News (Portsmouth) will be abbreviated EN.  
39 Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 02 March 1906. 
40 Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 22 May 1906; Sydney Morning Herald, 22 May 1906. 
41 EN, 21 May 1906. 
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Rather than being presented, or presenting themselves, as the menacing Other, this ‘port-town 
diplomacy’ showcased the Japanese as equals, not as inferior, as Kowner suggests.  During the 
visits lavish naval pageantry and entertainments were provided on a par with any other programme 
of entertainment to a Western nation.42 Official engagements included various tours of naval 
training establishments, evening banquets and lavish parties in the naval barracks, civic banquets 
and parades through the urban space, sporting events and trips to the theatre. The amount of 
coverage in the local press in both countries can show us how important the visit was regarded by 
the middle-class cultural commentators of the town, and also how it served as a way to allay the 
fears of the population over the ascendency of their unfamiliar allies. 
What is striking about the visits to Portsmouth and the two Australian cities is the 
difference in onus on who was hosting their visitors, which was predicated by the specific balances 
of power within the port town. In Portsmouth the Royal Navy are central in organising the 
programme of events. The civic input is present, but a lighter touch. In Australia where the Royal 
Navy was less dominant Japanese officers were courted by Federal and Civic dignitaries, and the 
cadets were even indulged by days out funded by local businesses.43 It is telling that on saying 
goodbye to the Superintendent at Royal Naval House, Sydney, Rear-Admiral Shimamura noted 
that that it was the only place he had not been entertained in.44 
During the visit to Portsmouth naval officials stressed the affinities between Japan as a 
naval nation. At an official Royal Navy reception to welcome the Japanese officers, Commander-
                                                 
42 See for reference the reporting of the visit of the French Northern Squardon in August 1905. EN, 07 August 1905. 
43 Sydney Ferries hosted a trip to Parramatta, up the river from central Sydney. Cumberland Argus and 
Fruitgrowers’ Advocate, 26 May 1906. 
44 Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 1906. 
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in-Chief Admiral Sir Archibald Douglas KCB praised the progress of the IJN and their impressive 
naval victory at Tsushima where the ‘Japanese Naval men had proved what they were worth, and 
what they were made of.’45 The qualities of a martial race, very similar with those the British 
bestowed on themselves, were lauded as admiration was conveyed for their ‘splendid devotion’ to 
their county, their Emperor, their bravery and their skill. However, it was stated that their success 
was 
… coupled with the fact – and this was most important – that they were always determined 
to possess the best ships and the best weapons that could be procured.46 
 
This directly referred to the fact that Katori and Kashima, like their predecessors, had been built 
by British shipbuilding companies. Captains Sakamoto and Ijichi themselves were also trained by 
Admiral Douglas. Douglas claimed that ‘Everyone in the British Empire held the Japanese in the 
highest esteem’ and likened the two naval nations by claiming that ‘the Japanese and British sailors 
were really one at heart.’ He added that: 
The two countries were now allied by a Treaty, in which they were bound to protect each 
other’s interest. They were happy in having such a compact, for Englishmen knew that the 
Japanese Navy was not only well abreast of the times, but the Japanese officers and men 
knew well how to manipulate ships and weapons, They would never fall behind, nor yet be 
found wanting.47  
 
This parity was extended throughout the trip where in speech, and in print, the two nations were 
depicted as kindred. However, there were undertones of condescension in their remarks which 
belied the British tendency to act as patron and master to its young Japanese naval protégé. For 
example, at a Warrant Officers’ luncheon at HMS Excellent Gunnery School, Chief Gunner W. 
                                                 
45 EN, 04 June 1906. 
46 EN, 04 June 1906. 
47 EN, 04 June 1906. 
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G. Jones toasted the Emperor of Japan and stated that ‘there had been ample proof lately that Japan 
was a well-governed country.’48 Indeed, there were other references made to Japan as being the 
‘England of the East’ throughout the visit.49 One journalist infantilised and Anglicised the Japanese 
visitors by commenting that ‘Their whole demeanour justified the fanciful description applied to 
them ‘The happy children of England in the East.’50 
Whereas this brand of navalism worked inside the home of the Royal Navy, Australia’s 
navalist sentiments were predicated on the desire for increased coastal defence, especially in the 
context of a rising Japanese naval force. The call for Australia to build its own navy had two 
distinct arguments which fell into both nationalist and imperialist camps. The imperialist argument 
was in favour of contributing to the cost of their naval and merchant shipping defence as a duty to 
the Commonwealth. On the other hand, the nationalist reasoning for a navy was create a country 
capable of its own coastal defence, and would be a step towards independence from the mother 
country. For example, comments from the right-leaning Brisbane Courier outlined the 
precariousness of the Australian situation. Their editorial, published the day after the Japanese 
Training Squadron arrived in Melbourne, used the rise of the IJN as a platform from which to 
espouse their views on building up an effective cadet force, ready for an Australian naval force 
‘manned and maintained by Australians.’51  
On the other end of the political spectrum, Australian Labour Party-affiliated newspaper 
The Worker, which had a pro-White Australia, pro-Commonwealth stance, commented in the 
                                                 
48 EN, 04 June 1906. 
49 EN, 07 June 1906. 
50 EN, 07 June 1906. 
51 Brisbane Courier, 10 May 1906.  
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months before the Japanese visit that current geopolitical tensions were affecting Australia as never 
before. It speculated on the likelihood of a war with the US or Japan, before it stated: 
Germany, England’s most likely antagonist, is steadily creating a powerful navy. Germany 
is growing stronger in the Pacific, and has a naval base within easy striking distance of the 
Australian seaboard. Military experts are continually warning us that we are in a 
defenceless and unprepared condition. We want to keep the Commonwealth for a white 
English-speaking race. What are we going to do about it, and when?52 
 
Indeed, the distrust of the Japanese, and the issue of pan-Asian alliance echoed in the editorial of 
Victoria’s leading newspaper, The Age. 
... it might easily happen that during some great conflagration of war China and Japan 
would become the allies of some Power hostile to Britain, and to be led into aggressive 
tactics toward the Commonwealth. Though the present alliance between Britain and Japan 
makes for the maintenance of stability in the East, there is no more guarantee that it could 
stand the shocks originating in international complications ... The very presence of a 
portion of a Japanese fleet on a friendly mission in our waters is a reminder that Japan has 
put itself at the head of the East in securing a share of sea power, and that Australia must 
take serious stock of the great national problem of providing in the most efficient way for 
local and imperial defence.53 
 
The solution, according to the editor Gottlieb Schuler, was to populate Australia with ‘our own 
white stock who should make Australia their fatherland.’ On the issue of defence, he stated that 
Australia had ‘no natural taste for militarism’, but would need to ‘approach the question ... with 
the most intelligent foresight and prudence.’54 
Melbourne’s Weekly Times, however, was happy to welcome the Squadron as ‘Allies of Great 
Britain’ arguing that Japan’s role in quelling Russia’s influence in China ‘Struck a great blow on 
the behalf of British interests in the Far East.’ The newspaper asserted, however, that the Japanese 
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would not have been successful without the British Navy preserving a clear field for them during 
the Russo-Japanese War, and added that ‘the officers and the men ... are assured of a cordial 
reception by all sections of the community.’55 
The importance of a mutually reinforced relationship was highlighted during a banquet hosted 
by the Lord Mayor of Sydney. In front of many of New South Wales’s highest dignitaries including 
the Governor-General of Australia, Lord Northcote, Rear-Admiral Shimimura proclaimed that the 
courtesy shown to Japanese Squadron now, and during their previous visit in 1903, had been 
interpreted as evidence that Australia recognised the Japanese as allies. He hoped the treaty would 
be renewed ‘again and again, not for the purpose of aggression, but as a safeguard of the eternal 
peace of the world’ and further added: 
The Japanese successes on the sea were largely due to the ships built on the finest models 
of the British Navy, commanded and officered by men who had learned their profession in 
the British Navy.56  
 
Whereas British reports were largely self-congratulatory, the Australian press used the visit of the 
Japanese training Squadron to make parallels with their own position on the world stage. Sydney’s 
Daily Telegraph made connections with the simultaneous visit to Britain to take ownership of two 
British-built warships, reasoning that ‘so now in this outpost of Empire Australians now extend an 
equally sincere and admiring greeting ...’ However, the Editor was quick to assert the significance 
and advantages of the Japanese visit to Australia: 
Her appearance upon the stage of history as one of the first-class Powers of the world 
synchronises with the development of Australia from a loose connection of independent 
self-governing colonies into a united country, which already presents many of the 
characteristics of a nation, allied with, rather than subject to, Great Britain.57  
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Comparing Japan to Australia, the Editor noted the similarities of their styles of constitutional 
government, a mutual aim for ‘progressive and liberal domestic legislation for their people’ and 
high regard for ‘enlightened humanitarian principles.’58 The commentary goes on to espouse the 
virtue of better trade relations with Japan in the hopes of replicating links that New York had with 
Liverpool and London.  
The Japanese Squadron were in Sydney during Empire Day, which for some commentators 
provided an object lesson in the ‘Japanese Spirit’ which was taken to be ‘the care taken to instil 
love of country and loyalty to its rulers in the minds of the young.’59 Indeed, if it could be coupled 
with  
‘... a very wide extension of the cadet movement, so that all schoolboys could come into 
its scope ... we would have, as the Japanese have, enormously added to both the spirit and 
strength of the nation.’60 
 
Thus the IJN’s presence was an object lesson in how to achieve naval progress and imbed national 
character. 
 
Public reactions to the visits 
Finessing the cultural gap in the port town setting was still somewhat tricky, especially 
during encounters with the public. One sticking point for local missionaries was the concern for 
the ‘mortal souls’ of the Japanese sailors. Indeed, in Portsmouth, the very first engagement of the 
lower deck crew was a reception by naval welfare philanthropist, Miss Agnes Weston.61  During 
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her speech Miss Weston capitalised on the naval affinities between the two nations and made 
parallels between Admiral Nelson and Admiral Togo. Before they left, however, sailors were 
gifted a little book of Testaments in the Japanese language. She explained to the men that ‘It is a 
good Book, and upon its teaching this Institute has been built. We hope you take them away, and 
read and prize them.’ Thus for Weston, the visit of the Japanese sailors became a civilising mission 
whereby those yet to be converted to Christianity came to her, rather than having to travel to them. 
Graciously, the Japanese spokesperson, an unnamed Chief Petty Officer, thanked their hosts for 
the hospitality, and spoke about the notoriety of Miss Weston and her work in Japan saying that, 
as British Naval men have looked upon her as a mother, they have done so too.62 Certainly, there 
was a level of ‘Westernising’ that the Japanese representatives undertook and did much to assure 
the British public of their reverence for British naval hero Admiral Nelson during the interaction. 
In Sydney, the New South Wales Missionary Association (NSWMA) were less inclusive and 
invited only ‘Christians from the Japanese Squadron’ to afternoon tea at their depot where they 
were addressed by the pastor and told of the work of the Japanese Mission. This was followed by 
a service at the Mariners’ Church.63 Unlike Weston’s open-armed gesture to the Japanese, the 
NSWMA had very little uptake in their endeavours with only sixteen men from the squadron in 
attendance. 
Alteration in opinions about how the Japanese conducted themselves was based around 
Western, British, constructs of civilisation; enabling the Japanese to be accepted as trusted and 
worthy allies.  During a municipal tram tour of Portsmouth which a contingent of 200 Japanese 
sailors shared with around 100 Crimean War veterans, an old British veteran was reported to 
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exclaim, “My word! When I saw them at the Shimonoseki affair, fifty years ago … they were 
savages. What a change!”64 Perhaps a sign of public ambivalence can be hinted at by comparing 
their reception in various places in the town. Arriving at Portsmouth Town Hall after their tram 
tour, the Japanese naval men were loudly cheered. However, a report on the Japanese Navy 
attending the Theatre Royal in the afternoon painted a different picture of the local reception to 
their Japanese guests. Upon leaving the theatre the men were escorted by the band of the HMS 
Prince of Wales, which played them back to the Dockyard. However, it was reported that, although 
an ‘immense crowd’ gathered to see the Japanese pass, ‘there was very little cheering.’65 This may 
very well be due to the level of public engagement. Within the civic spaces of the town, local pride 
could mingle with the festivity of the event. However, those outside the theatre were not engulfed 
in the pageantry of the visit, and ‘ownership’ of the space was considered in a different light.  
In Australia the visitors certainly attracted a crowd. It was reported that 18,000 members 
of the public visited Port Melbourne to indulge in visiting the ships of the Japanese Training 
Squadron on Sunday 13 May.66 On Wednesday 16 May 600 Japanese sailors, accompanied by 
Naval Reserves and the crew of HMS Psyche, were led through the decorated streets of Melbourne 
by the Naval Reserve Band to the Zoological Gardens. Their procession through the main 
thoroughfares of city to Victorian Government-led entertainments was observed by the State of 
Victoria’s Premier, Thomas Bent, several of his Ministers, the Lord Mayor, and an estimated 
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50,000 spectators.67 This occupation of space in the port city, as argued by the Melbourne 
magazine Table Talk, roused a patriotic but wary and resigned tone. 
The presence of the uniformed and disciplined Japs, many of whom have come out of 
Titanic battlefields in Asia, made the same chord of nationality vibrate in a different way. 
The Japanese are here as friends, allies and guests. The British alliance and other 
considerations, it is believed, will never permit their landing on these shores in any other 
capacity. And so the brave little brown men have been cordially welcomed.68 
 
The reports from the Australian national and provincial press usually recorded the utmost 
cordiality and civility in the ways in which the Japanese guests were treated. However, one report 
in a Tasmanian daily newspaper The Examiner noted how after a ‘judicious’ welcome and a toast 
to the Trustees of the Melbourne Zoological Gardens, Victorian Premier Thomas Bent exclaimed 
that it would be of no use to talk in ‘pigeon English’ before turning to his Minister of Education 
saying ‘Here, you can propose these Japs after.’69 Interestingly, the report later takes pains to 
highlight the excellent English language skills of the Japanese in the speeches that followed.  
This incident however, paled in comparison to the actions of Queensland Senator Anderson 
Dawson70 later that month when he published his response to an invitation to an ‘At Home’ aboard 
the Hashidate in Melbourne. Dawson declined on the grounds that it would be hypocritical to 
accept Rear-Admiral Shimamura’s hospitality, and in an open letter which was widely condemned 
by his contemporaries in the Senate,71 he reasoned: 
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I do not trust you. I think the day will dawn when Australia will rue the day it showered so 
much “gush” on you ... This is candid, and not meant in any way personal to you, but to 
you as a people. Whether I am right or wrong, history will prove. 72 
 
Indeed, although most commentators and public figures rebuked Dawson for his remarks, their 
grounds were nearly always for the fact that he had been discourteous. His warnings were only 
thinly dismissed by reasoning that, the Australians had to trust their Japanese allies.  
Conversely, stereotypes could be undermined by one-to-one encounters where the Japanese 
visitors were able to be judged on a personal level, which did not always fit with the perceived 
notions of racial difference. Parallels were drawn between Britain’s most recent ally, the visiting 
French sailors a year previously, and the Japanese. The Evening News reported that the Japanese 
sailors ‘seem to bid fair to outrival the French in the matter of politeness.’ The report recalled an 
anecdote of a ‘street loafer’ who assisted three Japanese sailors in finding the correct tram to get 
back to the Dockyard. Although hoping for a tip to compensate his troubles the man seemed to be 
pleased to settle for big smiles, doffed caps and, as the paper wrote, a ‘Tank you very much.’73 
This highlighted the complications that the British public had with meeting another culture face-
to-face. When they did they could see that, apart from the language barrier and perhaps not 
understanding the concept of giving a tip, they were no different from Britain’s closest European 
neighbours.  
Similarly, the press in Sydney noted that although shore leave was freely given, and the locals 
were ‘prepared to “spoil” them with kindness’, no stories which showed the visitors abusing that 
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kindness were reported.74 Although still constituted through the lens of racial Othering, both 
Portsmouth and Australian experiences were positive. 
 
Conclusions  
Subsequent geopolitical changes, such as an alliance with Russia in 1907, and the 
establishment of Australian and New Zealand navies rendered the Alliance less attractive to the 
British. Certainly, as Keith Neilson argued, by the First World War, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
was seen as ‘leash, rather than a life-line’ to the British. This was further exacerbated when the 
Japanese were thought to have exploited the War to acquire German territories in the Far East.75  
However, we can learn much about the cross-imperial negotiation of race and encounters 
with Otherness within this short period. During the visits an uneasy parity was established by the 
Admiralty and reportage in the local press based on concepts of ‘civilisation’. These were 
legitimised to the public upon the criteria of Japanese naval prowess, and their established links 
with the Royal Navy and British technology. The IJN were also engineers of their own image, and 
through the spectacle and rhetoric of a shared naval culture, the people of Portsmouth, Melbourne 
and Sydney, and by extension those with vested interests following the events, were able to process 
complex narratives surrounding the discourse of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The port town thus 
became a place of mediation where high-level international diplomacy mingled with the face-to-
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face experience of an alliance ‘in practice’ and a space through which issues such as racial 
difference and imperial security were wrestled with and explored.  
Importantly, however, the message was interpreted differently from metropole to 
periphery. Whereas the Japanese naval visit to Portsmouth did little to destabilise British faith in 
its naval supremacy, it opened up questions for Australia in relation to the country’s geopolitical 
position and its ability to defend itself. Certainly, in 1907 the Western Australia-published 
newspaper The Australian, which argued that Prime Minister Alfred Deakin’s proposals for the 
construction of a national navy was almost unanimously accepted by the wider population due to 
the rising threat of Japan in the Pacific.76 
Through reportage and elaborate naval and civic ceremony, and by the physical presence 
and encounters with the Imperial Japanese sailors themselves, citizens of the British Empire were 
able to un-Other their ally and consider the Japanese as fit to sit at the table of the (White) World 
Powers. The host ports were also able to push their own agendas for advancement within the 
British Imperial framework. Although some ingrained stereotypes and assumptions still remained, 
through the lens of ‘port town diplomacy’ we can see how the British public was able to understand 
the Alliance with Japan and use it as a fulcrum to open up wider debates on concepts of race and 
cultural fluidity during the height of the British Empire. 
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